This research applies the stochastic frontier analysis benchmarking method to measure the performance of the water sector in Portugal. It estimates a multiproduct translog cost function in order to study the efficiency of the water and sewerage services, using an unbalanced panel comprising 68 Portuguese water utilities for the biennium 2004-2005. The sample is formed by concessionaire companies, municipal companies and semiautonomous utilities which represent approximately 61% of the Portuguese population, around 6.4 million inhabitants. The water utilities studied have a satisfactory level of efficiency (89% on average). The study points to the assumption that private utilities are, on average, more efficient than public utilities and that there are benefits if the companies specialize in providing a single activity. It also leads to the conclusion that there are increasing economies of scale and decreasing economies of scope associated with the Portuguese water sector. 1 Here the water utilities include not only the water supply but also the wastewater activities. The classification of water utilities in Europe as services of general (economic) interest is not consensual. For different reasons some countries do not accept the economical features of this good, opposing themselves to the Water Framework Directive.
Introduction
The water utilities are generally classified as services of general (economic) interest, owing to the fact that they are essential to the citizens' welfare, public health, economic activity and environmental protection 1 . The efficiency and quality of these services are a key factor of competitiveness and cohesion because of their importance in the economy and in the production of other goods and services. They are quasi-perfect examples of a natural monopoly and this market can be characterized by the absence of competition and thus of incentives for efficiency and effectiveness 2 . So, it is necessary that some kind of visible hand (regulation) exists to protect the interests of the users and to supervise the prices and the quality of service. The regulatory tools are, in most cases, the only way of creating a market, stimulating competitiveness and, therefore, contributing to the improvement of performance.
There are several benchmarking methodologies for measuring efficiency, such as data envelopment analysis (DEA), index numbers, stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) and regression methods (e.g. ordinary least squares (OLS) and corrected ordinary least squares (COLS)). These techniques are generally classified into two main categories, parametric methods and non-parametric methods (for methods to compute efficiency, see Coelli et al., 2005) . The parametric methods allow for noise estimation but imply the previous specification of a functional form to estimate the process of transforming the resources (inputs) into products (outputs) while non-parametric methods are empirically based models which do not need specification of the function for the production process to be previously defined. Both methods can further be divided into frontier and non-frontier if they enable the comparison of performance with the best practices or with the average adjustment 3 . The non-parametric methods, often based on linear programming, are superior in terms of flexibility but they do not consider the existence of random errors and it is difficult to know if our model or the outcomes obtained are good enough, although recent studies seem to oppose these ideas (Simar & Wilson, 2008) . The best known non-parametric method is DEA 4 . In this research we prefer to employ the parametric methods as one of our major aims is to study the market structure of the Portuguese water sector 5 . The ownership, size, diversification and vertical integration effects are better investigated with SFA. Besides, some DEA studies have already been carried out in the water sector in Portugal (Marques & Silva, 2006) . Initially published by Meeusen and Broeck and by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt in 1977 , the SFA methodology is generally used by regulators for the productive efficiency computation 6 . Its main technical feature consists of the decomposition of the error term (E i ) into two parts, one is a non-negative random variable that represents the inefficiency, u i , and the other is a random error term which reflects the random influences to which the entity is subject to and which cannot be controlled, v i , (Meeusen & Broeck, 1977; Aigner et al., 1977) . One of its main advantages, especially when compared with non-parametric benchmarking techniques, is the possibility of doing a statistical inference analysis easily. Conversely, one of the main difficulties of this model is related to the high number of options that it is necessary to define a priori, particularly the choice of the functional form to be used and the distribution to be followed by the error term.
This paper provides several contributions to the literature. First we apply a multiproduct translog cost function to measure the efficiency of the water sector in Portugal. Although these methodologies have already been applied to the water industry in other countries, seldom do they cover the water sector as a whole (water and wastewater and wholesale and retail segments) or encompass so many variables as in this study. Second, we extensively review all the studies about the use of parametric techniques in the water sector. As far as we know, this is the first time that the literature on parametric studies of efficiency in the water sector has been systematized. Finally, the Portuguese case study is used to analyse the influence of privatization as well as the existence of scope and scale economies and other contributions to efficiency in the water utilities.
The current research is organized as follows. After this brief introduction, in Section 2 some considerations about the water sector in Portugal are made. Section 3 reviews thoroughly the literature on SFA application to the water sector. In Section 4 the methodology adopted is explained and the multiproduct translog cost function is estimated. The sample is described in Section 5 and in Section 6 the results obtained are discussed and further analysed. Finally, Section 7 presents the major conclusions.
Water sector governance in Portugal

The institutional model
The water sector in Portugal follows the French institutional and regulatory model where the water and wastewater activities are under the responsibility of local municipal authorities that may delegate them to the private sector. However, there are some differences compared to the French model, such as the separation between wholesale (bulk) and retail (end-user) services which correspondingly refer to regional systems and municipal services, the state as the main operator through state-owned companies and the existence of a sector-specific regulatory agency, the Institute for the Regulation of Water and Waste (IRAR). The municipal authorities can choose between four provision models, such as municipal services (activities provided directly by municipalities), semi-autonomous utilities, municipal companies and concessionaire companies. The first three models are under public management carried out by the local municipal authority or the state, whereas the concessionaire companies are under private management.
Private sector participation was not introduced into the water and wastewater activities until 1993. From that year onwards local municipal authorities have been allowed to delegate these functions to private sector companies under the existence of a public tender. With the possibility of private sector participation it became necessary to monitor and supervise these activities. After some unfortunate experiences (e.g. the creation of an Observatory), a regulatory agency (IRAR) was set up in 1998.
IRAR is a public institute endowed with administrative and financial autonomy but subject to the influence of the Ministry for the Environment. Its objectives are to assure the quality of the services provided, and to supervise and guarantee the balance and sustainability of the sector, under the terms of its statutes and the law. IRAR also performs functions such as monitoring and supervising all the water utilities and preparing an annual report about the operators' compliance with legislation. According to the current legislation, only the regional, municipal and intermunicipal systems under concession contracts are subject to regulation by IRAR. The local administration bodies in charge of the systems direct management, such as municipal councils, municipal services, municipal and inter-municipal companies, are only liable to IRAR's action as far as water quality for human consumption is concerned.
During the last decade, the water sector in Portugal has presented an extraordinary development, which has enabled a huge advance in water utilities expansion to almost the entire Portuguese population, not only due to the European funds but also to the significant effort that the utilities have made. However, it is still necessary to solve some problems relative to the efficiency and effectiveness of the activities performed, such as water losses, excess staff in urban areas and insufficient staff in rural areas, inadequate tariff systems, inefficient asset management and low levels of quality of service provided to the users. If in the past the challenge was to expand and increase the coverage of water and wastewater services, today it is certainly performance improvement (Marques, 2008) .
The regulatory model
The regulatory model adopted by IRAR comprises two ambitious intervention plans for the sector, one at the level of structural regulation and the other at the level of the operators' behaviour in the market. Despite the importance of other functions, IRAR has gained prominence in the regulation of the quality of service. The strategy followed, which includes the public display and regular comparison (benchmarking) of a set of performance indicators, the so-called sunshine regulation, has become a powerful and effective tool in providing performance incentives by promoting virtual competition between operators (Marques, 2006) .
IRAR's regulatory model includes the use of performance evaluation tools and their comparison with the results of other similar operators, acting in distinct geographic areas (benchmarking). These mechanisms must always adopt pedagogic and value added logics, for example by benefiting the operator's performance relative to the average performance of all the operators. For this purpose, the regulatory authority obtains information from the operators through previously defined performance indicators and, upon validation, carries out a comparative analysis based on the historical records of the operator. Like this, the evolution over time of different activities provided by the operators and the comparison with their peers allows for the definition of performance levels and the establishment of reference values, which enable the setting of new efficiency goals in a realistic way. The results of this comparison are presented in an annual report available at the regulator's website.
This model of regulation evaluates the performance of each operator individually. When a water utility provides more than one of the services evaluated (water supply, wastewater and/or solid waste), the system of performance indicators is applied individually. In each group, the utilities are further divided into ''wholesale'' and ''retail'' or ''mixed'' to enable a better comparison between them (''apples with apples''). The set of 20 performance indicators adopted for each of the activities regulated tries to represent, in summary, the most important aspects of the quality of service. Table 1 shows the performance indicators used for the water activity and their computation for the period 2004-2007. The average values outside brackets represent the wholesale market and the values inside the brackets the end-users services.
IRAR evaluates and issues some comments regarding each indicator for each operator with the aim of helping the operators to improve their services. This evaluation is done through a system of classification that compares the value obtained with reference values. The latter are optimal values, or close to them, that the regulator deems as likely to be attained by the water utilities if they operate efficiently. However, these reference values cannot be analysed per se or out of context. IRAR takes into account the adjustment for environment, encompassing the non-controllable factors in the performance analysis. The evaluation performed by IRAR is qualitatively classified as good, average or unsatisfactory, respectively corresponding to a green, yellow or red ball according to the divergence between the result obtained with the indicator and the reference values interval. The sunshine regulation results have proven its benefits (Marques & Simões, 2008) which can be observed by the positive change in performance indicators scores.
During the presentation and public display of the results in 2004 (first year of application) a great controversy arose in the sector, with the firms questioning the methodology and pointing out the weaknesses of the performance indicators as partial measures of productivity. If they were mostly right in their criticism, the justification of the regulator was stronger since this discussion and controversy have generated a performance improvement in the whole sector. Today the sunshine regulatory model is accepted by the industry and is used by the media to pressure the utilities. The results of this ''name and 0.4 (0.5) 0.4 (0.5) 0.4 (0.5) 0.4 (0.5) shaming'' strategy, especially regarding the quality of service provided, were so good that the regulatory model was exported to other industries (e.g. hospitals) 7 .
Market structure
Until the reforms of 1993, the water utilities were almost wholly vertically integrated. In that year the Government paved the way for the creation of bulk (regional) services both in water and wastewater. These services belong to the state as a major shareholder and include municipalities with minority shareholder positions. Several state-owned (regional) companies were created (18 in total encompassing nearly 60% of the population), one of them only for water (abstraction, treatment and transmission), others only for wastewater (final transportation and treatment wastewater), others still for water and wastewater and another one for water, wastewater and solid waste. The customers of these companies are exclusively the municipalities.
In horizontal terms the utilities have a reduced degree of integration, as there are 300 utilities for almost 10.3 million inhabitants 20% of whom are supplied by private operators. In Portugal only 18 water utilities supply a population of more than 100,000 inhabitants and 109 cover a population of less than 10,000 inhabitants. Concerning the services delivered, the utilities almost always provide water and wastewater services together. They often include urban solid waste services and, less frequently, other activities like transportation. There are only a limited number of operators that provide water and wastewater services individually. Table 2 shows the retail segment of the Portuguese water market structure and Table 3 illustrates the wholesale market.
Review of the relevant literature
There are more and more studies that aim to determine and evaluate the efficiency levels of the water utilities. Regulators are one body most interested in the use of this kind of studies. When they adopt incentive regulations (e.g. CPI-X formulas) efficiency and productivity are estimated using these techniques. Frequently there is also a comparison between the efficiency levels presented by the different kinds of ownership (public and private) and management (e.g. corporatization or not). Simultaneously, these studies also aim to verify the existence of economies of density, economies of scale and economies of scope. The literature review done in the scope of this research intended mainly to analyse studies that applied the SFA or similar parametric methodologies. Thirty-five works were found in the scope of the efficiency estimation in the water sector with these tools up until the middle of 2008. This number is quite similar to the use of non-parametric techniques such as DEA 8 .
In Portugal the first steps are being taken towards efficiency measurement in the water sector, mostly because until recently there was no organization responsible for the regulation of this sector and there was only one work (using parametric techniques) that reviewed the Portuguese reality (Martins et al., 2006) . Most of the literature reviewed adopted cost functions. An explanation for this may be the fact that society is more sensitive to monetary values and it is easier to obtain the necessary data for the water utilities, particularly in their account reports. In addition, the use of a cost function is also widespread because in a regulated environment, where utilities do not set prices and are responsible for satisfying demand at the prices set by regulators, it is reasonable to assume that inputs (and therefore costs) are endogenous while outputs are exogenous.
More recent studies, like that of Saal & Parker (2005) and Weeks & Lay (2006) , apply input distance functions in the analysis of multiproduct companies. There is also a significant number of Table 3 . Water market structure in Portugal for the wholesale segment.
Regional services
Municipalities ( Water and wastewater studies that use and compare the results obtained from different types of methodologies, such as Antonioli & Filippini (2001) who apply OLS and GLS methods and Estache & Rossi (2002) who compare the OLS, COLS and SFA models. Other researchers, despite using just one methodology, compare the functional forms adopted and/or the distributions followed by the inefficiency variable of the error term, such as Bhattacharyya et al. (1995b) and Lin (2005) , who compare three different types of distribution and Mizutani & Urakami (2001) who use the functional forms of the Cobb-Douglas model, the traditional translog and the translog with a hedonic function. There are also several studies that examine the impact of the technological evolution in the sector's efficiency by analysing observations over more than one year, that is, they check the existence of improvements in the results presented by the water utilities year after year. Studies in countries with different models of water sector governance usually compare the results between them. Bhattacharyya et al. (1995a Bhattacharyya et al. ( , 1995b , Estache & Rossi (2002) and Martins et al. (2006) do this. In England and Wales the levels of efficiency are compared before and after the privatization of the water utilities (1989), or by the scope of the services, whether they are water only companies or water and sewerage companies, as discussed by Bottasso & Conti (2003) and Saal & Parker (2005) 9 .
It is also usual to investigate the existence of economies of scale, density and/or scope along with the study of the water utilities efficiency. The articles of Lynk (1993) , Antonioli & Filippini (2001) , Mizutani & Urakami (2001) , Fraquelli & Moiso (2005) , Martins et al. (2006) and Filippini et al. (2007) give examples of this situation. The outcomes of these studies prove that the water sector, in several countries, is mainly characterized by the existence of economies of scale, economies of density and economies of scope, but there are also studies with opposite results. Appendix 1 (available online at http://www.iwaponline. com/wp/032.pdf) systematises all the studies found in the literature up until April 2008.
Model specification and methodology
The SFA methodology is applied to the Portuguese water utilities in order to evaluate the efficiency and the existence of economies of scale and economies of scope associated with this sector by means of a multiproduct translog cost function. It was also an aim of this study to determine the efficiency drivers, such as the ownership influence.
The cost function intends to minimize the costs of production for a given level of output. It indicates the minimum cost required to produce a set of outputs with knowledge of the level of production, the input prices and the technology. The stochastic frontier cost function may be described as:
where C i represents the cost of production of the water utilities i, C(.) is an adequate functional form (such as the Cobb-Douglas or translog models), y i is the quantity of outputs, w i is the vector (exogenous) prices of inputs and b is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated (Coelli et al., 2005) . The term C(y i ,w i ) is called a cost frontier curve or stochastic frontier. It is assumed that v i is an independent variable and identically distributed (i.i.d.), with normal distribution with mean zero and a standard deviation s v 2 (v i ¼ N(0,s u 2 )) and independent of u i , a variable equally i.i.d. which can follow a half-normal, truncated-normal, exponential or gamma distributions, the first one being the most usual 10 .
The specified cost function considers the price of three inputs, the cost of staff, the cost of capital and the other costs, respectively, and the production of two outputs, correspondingly the distributed (revenue) water volume and the collected (revenue) wastewater volume. Additional explanatory variables relative to the water losses, the governance model, the imported water, the wastewater treatment and the provision of other services are also included 11 . The cost function can be presented as:
C ¼ CðW; S; PL; PK; PO; LO; dPriv; dSou; dTreat; dOthÞ ð 2Þ
where C represents the total cost and W and S are the outputs revenue water volume and collected wastewater volume, respectively. Total costs encompass all the costs 12 . The price of the inputs PL, PK and PO correspond to the cost of labour, the cost of capital and the other costs, respectively. PL is defined by the ratio between the staff costs and the staff number, in Euros per employee. PK is calculated by dividing the capital expenses (CAPEX) by the sum of the water utilities mains length, in Euros per kilometre and PO is obtained by the ratio between the sum of the remaining costs presented by the utilities and the sum of the water volume distributed and the collected sewage volume, in Euros m À3 . The variable LO, percentage of water losses, consists of the ratio between the water losses volume and the total volume of distributed (revenue) water introduced in the network. The volume of water losses (or more exactly the non-revenue water volume) is the difference between the water volume distributed and the revenue water volume, that is, it comes from leakages, bursts, network discharges, unbilled or unauthorized consumption, and so on. A priori, high water losses correspond to higher inefficiency. The binary variable dPriv concerns the ownership, with a value equal to one if it is private and equal to zero if otherwise. The binary variable dSou evaluates the existence of imported water, with a value equal to one if it does not exist and equal to zero if otherwise. It is assumed that a water utility does not import water if the water utilities distribute water exclusively from their own sources, that is, if they do not buy water from other water utilities (if they are verticalized or not) 13 . The binary variable dTreat indicates that if the utility has its own wastewater treatment plants for all or most of the sewage treatment, the value is equal to one and equal to zero if otherwise 14 . The binary variable dOth, relative to the scope of the services, 10 All the distributions were tested. Unlike the gamma distribution results, the others are quite similar. The correlation coefficients between them (Spearman and Pearson correlation coefficients) are always greater than 0.97. 11 Other factors, such as the peak factor, water abstraction, density of customers, number of customers and their kind were also tested but without valid results. It was expected that high peak factors (large capital costs), superficial water (more treatment costs), high density of customers (proxy of network complexity) and low number of customers would lead to more inefficient costs, which was not confirmed. 12 Note that in some international comparisons or even in some cases the existence of subsidies can be relevant when they change between the water utilities. Although in Portugal subsidization is an important issue, it is relatively homogeneous and therefore the relative efficiency is not altered. 13 Indeed, when the dSou or DPriv dummies (or others) are included, a premise about a different frontier for each group is assumed. This seems a reasonable hypothesis since the technology is different for private or public utilities or for verticalized or non-verticalized ones. 14 In this case (as in the imported water variable) the companies have their own wastewater treatment plants (or abstraction facilities) or export their wastewater totally (or import all the water supplied). As normally there are no intermediate circumstances, these variables are considered to be discrete variables.
shows whether or not the utility provides other kinds of services, for example, solid waste and urban transport, presenting a value equal to one when they provide them and equal to zero if otherwise.
The functional form specified for the multiproduct cost function should be linearly homogeneous in the prices of the inputs and the levels of outputs, reasonable in the number of parameters to estimate, and admit the value of zero for one or more outputs (Caves et al., 1980) . The translog specification does not assume the absence of production, once they are applied to all the outputs natural logarithms and the natural logarithm of zero does not have finite representation. In order to overcome this problem, the null values of the outputs were replaced by a value close to zero (0.1 9 ). The use of the generalized quadratic cost function, the composite cost function or a Box-Cox transformation in the translog function would be other alternatives. Other specifications, such as the Fourier functional form, could be adopted as well, but the same problems (and others, like multicollinearity) would exist. By applying the translog specification, expression (2) can be rewritten as:
where n and u represent both components of the error term, random influences and inefficiency, respectively. The term u follows a half-normal distribution. In order to impose homogeneity on input price, a normalization was carried out based on the price of other costs. Thus, the total cost, the labour cost and the cost of capital are divided by the variable other costs, contributing to the reduction of the numbers of parameters to be estimated. The multiproduct translog cost function (3) also allows us to test the hypothesis of whether or not economies of scale and of scope associated with the production of the utilities exist (Filippini et al., 2007) . The degree of economies of scale (E SL ) and the degree of economies of scope (E SP ) are obtained using expressions (4) and (5), respectively 15 :
Economies of scale measure the reaction of the cost of production relative to the volume of outputs produced. There are economies of scale when the increase in the size of production of the company originates a reduction in the average cost (per output unit) of production. In opposition, there are diseconomies when the average cost rises with an increase in size (Berg & Tschirhart, 1988) . The economies of scale are an important indicator for the determination of the utilities' optimal size. If the value estimated for E SL , given in expression (4), is greater than the unit, there will be economies of scale in the production of all the outputs, if it is less there will be diseconomies of scale and if is equal there will be constant economies of scale. Economies of scope arise from cost savings obtained from the joint production. They reveal the advantages in terms of costs when different outputs are produced by the same company rather than being produced separately by several companies. Unlike the economies of scale, the economies of scope are not related to the production level of each product but to the fact that they are produced simultaneously (Baumol et al., 1988) . According to the value estimated of E SP , in expression (5), if it is less, greater or equal to zero, there will be positive, negative or constant economies of scope, respectively 16 .
Data description
Efficiency measurement is carried out over a sample of 68 water utilities operating in the biennium [2004] [2005] . The sample consists of an unbalanced panel that was made up of 131 observations, 63 water utilities for the year 2004 and 68 for 2005. The sample comprises 23 concessionaire companies, 14 municipal companies and 31 semi-autonomous utilities which encompass 75 municipalities. It covers approximately 61% of the Portuguese population potentially served, about 6.4 million inhabitants. The water utilities under direct management of municipalities, called municipal services, are not included in this research owing to the difficulty of getting the necessary data, given that the expenses in these services are not controlled and the number of staff engaged in the water and wastewater activities is unknown.
The information used in this study was provided by the water utilities themselves through their annual account reports, for the years 2004 and 2005. They include information about operation and maintenance costs (OPEX), CAPEX, revenue volumes and produced volumes, number of customers, number of staff, mains length as well as other technical and management data.
The set of collected data contains information about the total cost, prices of inputs, quantity of outputs and other explanatory variables. Table 4 presents the summary of the statistical parameters of all the variables included in the model. Figure 1 presents the unit costs (h/m 3 ) of water utilities of our sample. We previously removed two utilities which were considered outliers (as they had started their functions recently). Even so, the dispersion between the smallest and largest utility in sample is very high, since the former provides water and wastewater services to 7,134 inhabitants and the latter (which includes the capital Lisbon) to 519,795 inhabitants. Nevertheless, the model adopted takes into account these differences and the results are not affected by them.
Empirical results
The results of the estimation of the stochastic frontier cost function applied to the Portuguese water utilities, obtained with the software LIMDEP 9.0, are presented in Table 5 . The estimated results for the model parameters are statistically significant and confirm the expected results. It is noticed that the function is non-decreasing in input prices and non-decreasing in outputs, the typical properties of a cost function.
The positive sign of the variable LO shows that the smaller the volume of water losses the lower the cost of the water utility. Similarly, the positive sign of the binary variables dSou and dOth, indicates that the utilities produce the total amount of water delivered, that is, they do not import water and those that provide other services additionally to the water and wastewater activities (e.g. solid waste and transportation), present an increase in the total cost. The negative sign of the binary variables dPriv and dTreat proves that the utilities under private management and those that treat sewage in their own treatment plants present more reduced total costs than increased costs. The binary variables dPriv and dOth are statistically significant at 1% and dSou at 5%, respectively 17 . However, dTreat is not statistically significant. The parameter l is statistically significant at 1% so that the specified model is adequate and provides satisfactory results in the explanation of the inefficiency sources 18 .
The specification of the model was tested through the hypothesis tests, comparing the translog functional form with the Cobb-Douglas functional form, that is, the null second-order coefficients. The results of the hypothesis test are presented in Table 6 . The statistical chi-square value rejects the null hypothesis of nonsignificance crossed effects of the translog model, so we conclude that the most appropriate form is the translog specification.
The variable u of the error term provides information about the efficiency level of each water utility. This level is calculated through the expression:
whose value is limited to the interval between zero and one, being equal to one if it is totally efficient and equal to zero if it is totally inefficient. The efficiency levels obtained for each water utility are shown in Figure 2 . From 2004 to 2005 the water utilities efficiency levels improved on average, although this is not very evident. Table 7 presents the statistic summary of the results.
The results displayed in the sample show an average efficiency of 89.4%, which means that the water utilities would be able to reduce their costs by 10.6% and keep producing the same amount of outputs (revenue water and wastewater volumes). The year 2005 presents, simultaneously, the best and the worst efficiency levels of the whole sample, the efficiency levels being 0.971 and 0.697, respectively. 17 The utilities that do not import water have higher costs, which might be evidence of diseconomies of vertical integration between water production on the one hand and delivery on the other. This result can be related to the scale economies of the wholesale services (production) which comprise, usually, several municipalities (the distribution corresponds to one municipality) and the diseconomies of scope (wholesale and distribution are in fact two different activities). 18 Non-parametric tests (e.g. Mann-Whitney test) were used to check the signal and the significance of the results. The results were always confirmed but only the ownership (privatization) has a relevant statistical significance.
The model developed by Battese & Coelli (1988 was estimated with the aim of analysing the efficiency change of the water utilities over the period of time studied. The Battese and Coelli model estimation results are very similar to the ones of the model applied in this research concerning value, signal and statistical significance. The Battese and Coelli model and the model adopted are largely correlated, displaying a correlation value equal to 0.98. In the Battese and Coelli model a value of Z positive means that inefficiency reduces over time. The value of Z obtained (0.01) was not statistically significant (0.972), revealing the existence of only very low efficiency earnings from 2004 to 2005, which is confirmed by the analysis of Table 7 19 . A possible explanation for these results would be the fact that the panel just contains information relative to two consecutive years and the productivity change in the water utilities is normally reduced.
As previously mentioned, the variable dPriv coefficient, statistically significant at 1%, indicates that the private companies present a higher level of efficiency compared with the public ones 20 . This effect is also observed in Table 8 which presents the values of efficiency by ownership model (public or private). The private utilities also depict very homogeneous efficiency levels, that is, they are little spread out. This effect is highlighted by the standard deviation statistical measure, which has a value of 0.039. Note, however, that although there was statistical significance, the difference is barely relevant materially since it only represents an average difference of 3 Euro-cents between public and private companies. The same occurs for other analysis which will be carried out next. 20 Notice that the private water utilities are regulated and the remaining are not. Thus, the positive effect of privatization can be associated with the regulation but not with the ownership. However, these outcomes are in line with other studies carried out in Portugal that apply non-parametric methods (Marques, 2008) . Table 9 and Figure 3 present the statistical summary of the efficiency levels by provision model, semiautonomous utilities, municipal companies and concessionaire companies, respectively. In order to make the graphical representation clear and easily understood, Figure 3 only provides data for the year 2005.
The concessionaire (private) companies are, on average, the most efficient utilities, whereas the municipal services show lower average efficiency levels. The most efficient utility is also a concessionaire company and the least efficient one is a municipal service. The effects are intuitively expected and confirm the results presented by the analysis of the efficiency levels by ownership.
The positive sign of the binary variable dOth proves that the water utilities providing other services, for example solid waste and urban transport as well as water and wastewater activities, present higher total costs. This effect is also confirmed by statistical analysis of the efficiency levels by type of service, namely the exclusive provision of water supply, the joint provision of water and wastewater activities and the additional provision of other kinds of services, as Table 10 and Figure 4 show.
The utilities that only provide the water supply service have the highest average level of efficiency (0.894) with a very small difference from the lowest average efficiency level (0.892) presented by the utilities that offer more than one service. Although it is only one utility that provides only the water supply that has the lowest efficiency level and one utility that provides both the water and wastewater that has the highest efficiency level of the whole sample, the results suggest the existence of benefits if the utilities specialize in providing only one type of service. As quoted above, the application of a multiproduct translog cost function allows calculation of the degree of economies of scale and of scope, by expressions (4) and (5), respectively. The results obtained, which are statistically significant, are given in Table 11 .
The estimated value of E SL , greater than one, explains the existence of economies of scale and E SP , greater than zero, seems to point out the existence of diseconomies of scope associated with the sample 21 . The existence of economies of scale in the sample shows that there is a reduction in the average cost of production (per unit of output) with an increase in the production scale, that is, the average size of the utilities should be higher so that they become more efficient. The results pointed out that about 5% of the total cost is related to diseconomies of scope, which is a significant value (around 6 Euro-cents m À3 ). Possible explanations for the presence of economies of scale in the water sector are the occurrence of considerable fixed costs that will be distributed by each unit produced, the existence of significant discounts by the suppliers given the high volume of purchases and the fact that a larger scale allows better division and specialization of labour by different employees. These results are in line with the majority of E SL E SP Economies 1.745*** 0.054*** ( ) value of t-statistics t-statistics. ***Significant at 1%. Fig. 4 . Efficiency levels by type of service provided for the year 2005. 21 As the statistical test is positive, the existence of scope economies rigorously cannot be ruled out (see footnote 15). However, as the sample fulfils the complementarity cost test and the signal of the dummies related to scope economies (dOth and dSou) have the same orientation, this conclusion can be accepted.
the studies found in the literature (see, for example, Torres & Morrison, 2006; Fillipini et al., 2007; Nauges & van den Berg, 2007; Sabbioni, 2007) . The existence of diseconomies of scope shows that the utilities under analysis did not have advantages in the joint production of several outputs and there was no reduction in the production average cost. By contrast, the production of more than one output, in this case the joint provision of water and wastewater activities, causes an increase in the average cost of production which may be due to the existence of cross subsidization between different activities within a single utility in the water sector and due to the specialisation which leads to higher productivity. This reinforces the idea that there are benefits if the utilities specialize in the production of a single output (provision of just one service), already stated in the analysis by the value given by the binary variable dOth and the levels of efficiency of the services provided. These results are consistent with those from other studies found in the literature such as Hunt & Lynk (1995) or Saal & Parker (2000) . Thus, as underlined before, the verticalized utilities are less efficient as well.
Conclusions
This study aimed to assess the efficiency of the water sector in Portugal, through the benchmarking methodology of SFA, commonly used by regulators to determine the productive efficiency. A multiproduct cost function with translog specification was applied to 68 water utilities. In a sector where these utilities provide services of general interest and act as quasi-perfect examples of natural monopolies, it is important to carry out studies whose aim is to encourage the improvement of performance.
It was found that the average level of efficiency is higher in utilities under private management. The concessionaire (private) companies are on average the most efficient ones and show the best level of efficiency observed in the sample. For the remaining models, the results correspond to what would be intuitively expected, that is, the municipal services with autonomy have the worst results and on average, correspond to the provision model with the lowest level of efficiency.
By analysing the efficiency levels according to the scope of the services it was also found that the specialization of services provided by the water utilities is beneficial, discouraging the expansion of their scope of business 22 . Like this, the water utilities that provide only the water supply service are more efficient (although only slightly).
Finally, it was concluded that the water utilities in Portugal work with increasing economies of scale and seem to highlight diseconomies of scope.
